5 Transformative social change

A. Introduction

Society is mostly indifferent to the fate of the chronically poor. Their short lives are of little importance, no obituaries mark their passing. In life, they often face open hostility. After her husband died, Maymana's father-in-law took her land and the court in her Bangladeshi village sided with him, rather than her (see Box 40). Vuyiswa was driven out of the family compound in the Eastern Cape. Angel lost her home twice to the Zimbabwean army, which was seeking to destroy the democratic opposition in the informal settlements. The chronically poor are kept in their place, not able to benefit from the rights others enjoy. As an ethnic Mong, Txab had to accept the Thai state's drive to push the hill tribes into permanent settlements. As a woman, she had to accept the arranged marriage her uncle demanded. Societies shape the lives of the chronically poor, but they in turn have little, if any, role in shaping society.

Social orders, such as class and caste systems or gender dynamics, reflect social and political relationships – of power and patronage, as well as competition and collaboration. Their effects are often ambivalent. Bonded labour is both a job and a prison. Home life provides shelter, but also a cover for violence. Nothing is static; social orders evolve when economic growth challenges the old with the new or collective action challenges power. Relationships that have long maintained chronic poverty, and limited the possibility of exit, can crumble – or reinvent themselves to prevent escape for all but the lucky few.

If they choose to do so, states can decisively weaken the grip of exploitative social orders. Effectively implementing laws against female infanticide and supporting the Scheduled Castes in India are public policies that enlarge the social compact. Egalitarian legal systems and gender-balanced inheritance rights similarly challenge the existing 'order' of society. The state thereby provides more exits from chronic poverty – exits that progressive social movements can widen further. Justice for the poor then becomes feasible. Too often, however, states continue to act unfairly, helping the strong, not the weak. Democracy is no guarantee against this, for the strong have power beyond their vote. And in the worst cases, predatory

Nothing is static – social orders evolve, and relationships that maintain chronic poverty can crumble.

states reflect the very worst in society, and inflict more misery upon the poor: such was the experience of Angel.

Change is possible, and is being achieved, but far too slowly. The traps of social discrimination, limited citizenship and poor work opportunities remain. Chronically poor people therefore continue to meet early deaths in countries that boast of their economic success – but in which social progress remains extremely slow. Being clear about economic goals is not enough. Social goals must also be clear, if policy is to open more exits from chronic poverty. Gender empowerment, social inclusion and increased 'agency' are, we believe, the three key goals and, therefore, this chapter's focus. We explore six sets of policy measures that have particular potency in tackling these. The politics is challenging, and country context matters, so these too are discussed.

B. Gender equality, social inclusion and increased 'agency': social goals to end chronic poverty

Gender inequality keeps Mayama, Txab, Vuyiswa and Angel poor. It denies education to girls, denies employment and resources to women, and leaves them powerless to make institutions (e.g. marriage, land tenure) work in their (families') interests. A social compact to end chronic poverty cannot be found without gender parity. Gender equality can improve with development. There are, however, many routes and speeds, conditioned by political history, religious beliefs, and broader cultural values. Leadership and effective public policy can find better and faster routes to gender parity. The recent protests against efforts to make inheritance rules gender equal in Bangladesh are demonstrative of how challenging this can be.

Social exclusion denies true citizenship to the chronically poor. It also endangers social stability, for the grievance of the excluded can boil over into violence (see Chapter 6). Constitutional means to affirm citizenship, and anti-discrimination policies, promote inclusion. Moreover, the provision of ante-natal, neo-natal and early-years health and

Box 40: Stories of discrimination

The lives of Maymana, Txab, Vuyiswa and Angel demonstrate the importance of social discrimination in creating and perpetuating chronic poverty. Maymana's most serious experience of discrimination was when her husband died in 1998. While she was still in the throws of grief, her father-in-law took control of the household's remaining agricultural land (Maymana had previously sold a portion of her acre of paddy – inherited from her father – to pay for medicine and treatment for her husband). Despite threats and warnings, Maymana tried to assert her rights in the village court, but to no avail. Despite having a strong case in Bangladeshi law, the *shalish* (traditional village court) ruled against her (as often happens when women claim rights to land).

For Txab, discrimination has been a constant feature of her life. As an ethnic Mong woman, Txab has attempted to find ways around restrictive practices in Thailand: the state's attempts to integrate the 'hill tribes' into permanent settlements, and the effects of social stereotyping. She also suffered as a child: in contrast to her brothers, she was excluded from inheriting her parent's assets, and was forced into an arranged marriage by her uncle.

Discrimination also played an important part in Vuyiswa's life story. Not only did apartheid define her life chances and her movements before 1990, but, in a similar fashion to Maymana, the death of her husband led to the loss of assets. Despite local protocol dictating that she should stay in her dead husband's rural compound in the Eastern Cape and raise their children, Vuyiswa was driven out of the compound by her dead husband's sister. With few alternatives, she moved to her brother's shack in Cape Town, finding casual employment as a domestic worker in the white suburbs.

For Angel, it has not been gender or ethnicity that led to discrimination, but her position in an informal settlement. Like all the residents of Plot Shumba – the informal peri-urban settlement in the Midlands, Zimbabwe, where she lived – Angel lost her home in February 2003, as the army demolished Plot Shumba in Operation Mariawanda. She was severely beaten and slept in a bus shelter for a month. She rebuilt her shack and her life, found work, fell in love, and gave birth to a child, only for her home to be destroyed again in May–June 2005, during Operation Murambatsvina. Unable to care effectively for herself or her son, Angel was reliant on local networks and an NGO for survival.

education measures can help to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Social movements that boost the profile of such measures, ensure governmental accountability, and demand the legal rights of all citizens, will help advance public policy. However, social inclusion may not dissolve specific cultural or social identities. In some cases, acknowledging difference, and perhaps maintaining a degree of cultural separation, is a starting point for developing less exploitative relationships between groups. The social compact is incomplete until the chronically poor are true citizens of their nations.

Adverse incorporation must be overcome to achieve true citizenship. The social relationships that bind the chronically poor sometimes protect them against absolute deprivation, but at the cost of denying voice and choice. They are stuck in economic activities with low returns, have few opportunities to utilise their endowments productively, and lack alternatives. What the chronically poor need is greater agency, more options to move out of oppressive social and economic relationships, and voice to articulate their interests. Enabling them to bargain for higher wages, and to assert their citizenship rights and entitlements, is vital (see Box 41).

Gender equality, social inclusion and greater agency constitute transformative social change. But how can progress

> *Ending chronic poverty is not a technocratic endeavour. Social movements give the issues their political edge and mobilise action for change.*

on these three goals be achieved in often very different country circumstances?

We focus on six policies, and their politics, that can yield a social compact. Four of our policies relate to education, reproductive health, migration and urbanisation, all of which strongly influence social relationships. Two of our policies are broader, and provide a wider framework in which political and social relations are embedded: namely, anti-discrimination legislation, and an enabling environment for social movements. These are discussed in reverse order, starting with the vital need to foster active social movements. Collectively, these policies build the social compact between citizens and their state.

Creating the enabling environment for social movements

Ending chronic poverty is not a technocratic endeavour. Social movements give the issues their political edge and mobilise action for change. By definition, they are not organisations *per se*. Rather, and more often, they are uncoordinated forms of collective action, popular protest and networks, that serve to link both organised and dispersed actors in social mobilisation.

> ### Box 41: Nijera Kori – 'Nowadays we do not even fear talking with the magistrate'
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> With an emphasis on the collective, rather than individual, empowerment and emancipation of landless Bangladeshi labourers, Nijera Kori ('we do it ourselves'; NK) is reversing their historic lack of voice, agency and organisation. Since 1980, the NGO has sought to enhance the collective capabilities of its constituents to claim their rights as citizens. By 2003, NK membership totalled 180,000 – half of whom were women, the vast majority being poor and some sizeable proportion being chronically so.
>
> NK groups (each with 16-30 members) hold meetings to: identify problems and solutions; analyse their own situation and its relationship to that of the poor in general; and learn of their legal entitlements. Members are encouraged to look beyond immediate survival needs and recognise their collective identity, which is made practicable by weekly group savings. These are invested, at the group's discretion, in collective assets, to then be shared equally among group members.
>
> As a result of group reflection, analysis, savings and knowledge of their legal entitlements, NK members have collectively pressured those who they perceive to be acting unjustly, from violent husbands to employers to corrupt officials – progressively changing the norms of behaviour. Members of this mobilising organisation have also benefited from: an overall increase in wages; a reduction of illicit payments; more regular attendance of teachers; the construction and registration of schools; a reduced incidence of dowry and violence towards women; a reduced use of religion to subordinate women; and, through successfully fielding candidates in local elections, pro-poor membership of local government structures.
>
> Comparisons with control groups have also revealed the tangible economic benefits of NK membership, which have included the greater likelihood of both owning land and of cultivating it on a collective basis; and also the lesser use of disadvantageous coping mechanisms.[1] In a similar survey, NK members also compared favourably in terms of social issues, such as health and education, with no evidence of gender discrimination in schooling.[2] Indeed, NK groups have exhibited greater gender equality: for example, women were more likely to participate in household decision-making, and less likely to vote according to their husbands' wishes. In the words of one participant, "[b]efore we even feared talking in front of our husbands, nowadays we do not even fear talking with the magistrate".[3]
>
> Sources: See Endnotes

Public policy must create an enabling environment for such grassroots and democratic organisations. Raising awareness about, and protecting, human and civil rights, and the promotion of a strong and autonomous legal system, are key first steps (not least as social movements often rely on court cases to establish important legal precedents). The pro-poor character of social movements is often determined by the dedicated role of NGOs or activists within a movement.[4] Such agents can be supported directly, by providing both the formal links to policymakers that movements often lack, and help to gain practical media skills for influencing public debate and discourse. A priority is to support stronger relationships between social movements and political institutions – particularly parties and parliamentary committees. Despite concerns regarding the importance of 'autonomy' of civil society organisations, the effectiveness of such organisations in tackling chronic poverty involves gaining a voice in national-level policy spheres. This, in turn, requires close relationships with political society.[5]

Social movements are an essential countervailing force. For this reason, the state may well be tempted to weaken, delegitimise or incorporate them. Social movements face their greatest challenges when states are predatory – and state violence is used. Nevertheless, strong social movements can emerge in relation to strong states.[6] The development community must do everything it can to support them.

Examples of successful social movements include those which supported human rights in the democratisation of Eastern Europe,[7] Ecuador's indigenous rights movement, which influenced the constitution through cultural struggles over the meanings of political institutions and actions,[8] and Brazil's Landless Workers' Movement (MST), whose 230,000 land occupations since 1984 forced the Brazilian government to begin to tackle land reform much faster.[9] Clearly, where democracy has taken hold, social movements have greater freedom to shape states. Democratic transitions in Asia and Latin America helped empower social activists and indigenous movements. Constitutional reforms in many Latin American countries, which recognise the multi-ethnic or pluri-national composition of the population, testify to the power of social movements under democracy.[10]

Movements vary enormously, however, and the chronically poor can lack both personal agency and time to engage. It is imperative to challenge exploitative relations that hold back livelihoods. Formal sector unions illustrate the power of social movements, but the chronically poor benefit most from unionising informal workers (see Box 29).[11] And women must forge autonomous organisations to avoid being marginalised (the struggle for women's land rights in Brazil, for example).[12] Good examples of social movements that include the chronically poor are the scavenger cooperatives; these have now emerged in many cities (see Box 42). Social movements can also contest the cultural politics that surround chronic poverty, particularly the ways that dominant discourses frame the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor.[13] They can challenge stereotypes of poverty or ascribed (e.g. ethnic) status, thereby weakening social orders that exclude and discriminate.

Scavengers searching through rubbish on the municipal dump (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). Photo © Adam Hinton/Panos Pictures (2003).

In summary, there are many ways to enhance the agency of the chronically poor. Ultimately, all involve building individual and collective assets, including the vital psychological asset of self-esteem. Thus, the indigenous Ecuadorian movement which influenced the new (1998) constitution not only enabled a wide raft of legal rights (such as land, education, language and health), but also gave confidence to indigenous peoples (see Box 43). Social protection releases individual potential, especially when it supports educational achievement. The Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme, and now the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, enables workers to negotiate better wages.[14] By giving cash only to women, Mexico's Progresa programme strengthens the power of women in the household.[15] India's school feeding schemes increase girl enrolment and attainment (see Box 51).[16] Bangladesh's Cash for Education programme has secured full gender parity in primary education and near parity in secondary education.[17] All of these measures build up a wide range of material and non-material assets, thereby opening escape routes out of chronic poverty.

Public action against discrimination

Discrimination is difficult to uproot. Economic interests defend it. Elites and the middle class reconfirm their status and self-worth through it. The poor internalise low status from an early age.[18]

To overcome such powerful social norms, public action must base itself on fundamental principles. Legal frameworks resting on human rights can break existing hierarchies. They help groups claim rights and entitlements (with social movements lobbying for those which states do not deliver). Such action is most powerful when part of a wider transformative development project (see Box 44 on India). Fallacies of innate inferiority (e.g. in relation to gender or disability), or of danger and 'otherness' from minority groups (e.g. in relation to migrants) are reduced. Barriers to social mobility are thereby eliminated, and the links between social identity, economic

Box 42: Working with 'scavenger' cooperatives

In Asian and Latin American cities, up to 2% of the population survives by scavenging. In many places these people earn very low incomes and have significantly worse rates of infant mortality and life expectancy than national population averages. They are often adversely incorporated into supply chains, selling their pickings to 'middlemen', who resell them for much higher prices. They are usually socially marginalised and stigmatised – even though scavengers are not always the poorest of the poor, their occupation is generally ascribed the lowest status in society. Politically, while small-scale patrons may provide some protection, in other places they are extremely vulnerable. In Colombia, scavengers are subject to 'social cleansing' campaigns, with municipal authorities often turning a blind eye.

In several cities across the South, however, municipal authorities and scavenger-led organisations have built enduring partnerships to organise the collection of waste and recyclables. Despite a particularly hostile social and political environment, the NGO Fundación Social in Colombia has been helping scavengers form cooperatives since 1986, and by 2001 had nearly 100 member cooperatives, collecting 300,000 tonnes of recyclable materials annually. In the Philippines, Linis Ganda cooperatives, developed under the stimulation of the women's Balikatan movement, operate across metropolitan Manila. In the Indian city of Pune, 'rag picker' cooperatives recycled some 25% of municipal waste in 1995. Such labour-intensive solutions to waste management are often cheaper and more efficient, in crowded and unpaved neighbourhoods, than imported capital-intensive methods. Such arrangements not only create routes out of poverty that are accessible to scavengers and other unskilled labourers (who are often among the chronically poor), but can also improve the environmental health of slum areas. And working formally with municipal authorities allows scavengers' organisations to negotiate better prices, working conditions (e.g. protective clothing), improved income security, and other benefits, which can help their members unlock poverty traps. These have included greatly improved access to healthcare, educational scholarships, legal services and insurance. Creating such partnerships demands political sensitivity. It will involve dealing with those with a vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo – from the 'middlemen' who currently exploit scavengers' labour, to their political patrons, or waste disposal companies and contractors. While each situation needs its own solution, picking the right allies – maybe local NGOs, social movements, or sympathetic members of the administration – and 'political moment' (e.g. a change of local government) is vital.

Source: Medina (2001)

Box 43: Indigenous activism in Ecuador

One of the 'successes' of the indigenous movement in Ecuador was to influence the new constitution of 1998, which now includes a chapter on indigenous collective rights. This guarantees security of communal land, recognition of indigenous (and Afro-Ecuadorean) territorial 'circumscriptions', and education in indigenous languages. It has also led to indigenous judicial and health practices, representation in all government bodies, participation in resource use decisions, and environmental preservation in indigenous lands and collective intellectual property rights. The Ecuador case is thus one in which movements have influenced inter-ethnic relationships and the relative standing and power of indigenous people.

The movement has created public debate on, and fostered constitutional change around, the structural causes of chronic poverty. It has also increased respect for, and the self-esteem of, indigenous peoples. Reforms to legal land rights have strengthened indigenous communities, as have local NGO programmes that have built legal capacity for community representatives. (In some cases this has enabled them to successfully challenge mining companies' attempts to displace them.)[19] Although poverty in indigenous communities remains chronic, in municipalities where indigenous organisations have had most success there is some evidence that they have been less severely affected by economic problems than others across Latin America.[20] And through reworking local governance and power relationships, discrimination against them has certainly decreased – an important goal in itself.[21]

Sources: See Endnotes

resources and political power are eroded. Anti-discrimination actions help marginalised groups become true citizens.

An example of an anti-discrimination measure that tackled extreme poverty is Malaysia's New Economic Policy (NEP). This sought to 'restructur[e] society to eliminate the identification of race with economic function', primarily aimed at targeting discrimination against Bumiputera (indigenous Malays). In 20 years (1970-90), poverty amongst the Bumiputera in Peninsular Malaysia decreased from 49% to 15%; and the percentage of 'hard-core poor' decreased from 3.9% in 1990 to 1.0% in 2002 (see Box 45).[22]

In practice, much anti-discriminatory action has failed to take account of intra-group differences and politics. Affirmative action measures – to enhance access to economic or educational institutions – sometimes have limited impact, enhancing the lives of the already better off among discriminated-against groups. Such outcomes can precipitate a backlash in defence of meritocratic ideals of fairness – for example, middle-class Indians resisting Dalit (formerly known as 'untouchables) empowerment. Similarly, the elite and middle-class-based movement in Santa Cruz and other Bolivian regions aimed to separate the country into autonomous political and fiscal regions, each responsible for its own taxation – a backlash against the redistribution necessary to finance affirmative action for marginal groups.

While the implementation of anti-discrimination legislation is often patchy, the very presence of such rights is important in itself. Overall, it is the combination of a variety of anti-discriminatory measures within a broader economic and social policy, based on the formation of a social compact, which will ultimately foster positive advances in gender equality, inclusion and agency and economic choice. In this respect, anti-discrimination measures can be insufficient in themselves, but in combination with further measures – such as equality before the law, the right to political association and

Anti-discrimination actions help marginalised groups become true citizens.

representation, the provision of basic health and education services, and tackling discriminatory attitudes and perceptions – they can help to address racial, economic, gender and social prejudice.

Supporting migrants and migration

Migrants link town and countryside, and support financial and other flows across urban/rural and national boundaries. The migration story is complex, but it clearly represents a pathway out of rural poverty for many, although not directly for the poorest, who tend to stay put.[23] Migration can extend agency and the range of economic choice, even at the lowest levels of skill and returns on labour (thus loosening exploitative,

Box 44: Job reservations in India

Job reservations in India succeeded in raising the proportion of persons from the Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC and ST) in regular salaried employment by about five percentage points; however, they place little emphasis on improving the job-related attributes of persons from the SC and ST. Given the gulf in educational standards between forward caste Hindus and persons from the SC and ST, another prong of policy could, and should, focus on improving the educational standards of SC and ST persons. Reserving places in management, engineering and medical schools will provide minimal benefit to poor SC and ST communities, since the beneficiaries of such policies are the members of these groups who are least in need of help. The real problem lies in the primary and secondary schools in India's villages and towns, which typically lack learning materials, teachers and sometimes even classrooms.

Source: Borooah *et al.* (2007)

Box 45: Integrating anti-discrimination with a long-term strategy for economic and human development: Malaysia's New Economic Policy

Malaysia's New Economic Policy was introduced in the early 1970s, following inter-ethnic violence in 1969. Its express aim was to address the imbalances in economic and human development outcomes between the poorer majority ethnic Malay population (the Bumiputera), and Chinese and Indian Malaysians. The policy had a long-term vision and was multidimensional in approach. This involved affirmative action in the economic sphere (such as employment and share-ownership quotas), alongside the promotion of long-term structural change in the economy. This was accompanied by a social policy which saw substantial investments in education and health services in rural areas, where most poor Malays lived.

While group inequalities persist and some indigenous peoples have been persistently excluded from the NEP 'deal', the New Economic Policy did achieve considerable progress in reducing ethnic Malay poverty and achieving greater interethnic equality. Between 1970 and 2002, the ratio of Chinese to Bumiputera per capita income declined from 2.3:1 to 1.8:1, and that of Indian to Bumiputera from 1.8:1 to 1.3:1; Bumiputera incomes grew by almost 14 times over these years, one-third as fast again as those of Chinese and Indians.[24] Measured by Malaysia's poverty line, the poverty rate declined, from 49% in 1970 to 5% in 2002,[25] and from 65% in 1970 to 15% in 1990 for Bumiputera (in peninsula Malaysia), although ethnic and urban-rural disparities persisted.[26] The country's dramatic economic growth and rise in living standards over the same period was an important factor in reducing poverty; but equally, anti-discriminatory policies may well have contributed to this growth, both through reducing conflict, and ensuring broad-based 'human capital' development.[27] When growth and living standards were threatened in the financial crisis of the late 1990s, the anti-Chinese violence conflict that occurred in Indonesia was largely absent in Malaysia.[28]

Sources: See Endnotes

and constraining rural, relationships). Often, migration is supported by social relationships – as kin collectively support a migrant's departure, act as a safety net should the venture fail, and act as a launch pad in urban locations (see Box 46).

Migration shakes up relationships and social orders. A classic example of this is from India, where lower caste people break out of caste constraints, especially strong in rural areas, to find new opportunities and escape poverty.[29] And key social codes and norms, such as gender roles, are stretched and altered by migration. But there is little research on the degree to which migration liberates, empowers or oppresses, and most research on migration remains gender blind.[30] Women migrants may be empowered by controlling their earnings, being exposed to new people and ideas,[31] but, if most are circular (or temporary) migrants, any empowering effects may be negated on returning to the patriarchal social context at home.[32] Migration for women offers threats as well as opportunities. Women migrants face exposure to risks in the informal sector – overwork, poor conditions and sexual abuse. The extension of appropriate workplace legislation into the informal sector could tackle some of this exploitation.

Many migrants find that new urban settings are much less secure and more threatening than the rural locations they left. Existing urbanites and governments are often relentlessly

Box 46: Migration and domestic fluidity

Vuyiswa's life vividly illustrates how households in South Africa are frequently stretched: straddling rural and urban spheres, with fluid and porous boundaries. Such fluidity is evidenced by survey data from a Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) study: household membership stayed identical in only five of the 48 households surveyed in 2002 and 2005. But while the composition of households changes through time, the kinship and social networks in which the household is embedded mean that geographically dispersed individuals and households are intimately connected. For example, Vuyiswa's elder sister Thembeka and daughter Nomsa, stay in her shack for extended periods, not least to take advantage of the economic opportunities and better health services offered in Cape Town. Over two decades ago, Vuyiswa's own arrival in 'town' was predicated on living with her brother. Just as there is a regular flow of people between households – such as children sent to school or to be looked after by relatives, or adults seeking employment or better health services – remittances too flow from the urban to the rural sphere.

Throughout Southern Africa, circular migration patterns established during the apartheid era (where the male migrants' wages did not cover the subsistence costs of wives and children left at home), have changed dramatically, becoming more complex and multifaceted. But this is not to say that rural–urban financial links are less profound. In many ways rural locations are still the social and cultural centre of people's lives (and such locations are frequently viewed through a romantic lens of social harmony and a straightforward way of life). But migration to urban areas is many individuals' only opportunity for accumulation – an activity which is always reliant on kinship and social networks forged in rural areas. It frequently leads to investment back into rural locations, whether in terms of livestock, the homestead, transport or a trading store.

Source: Du Toit and Neves (2006)

Box 47: Migration in Poverty Reduction Strategies

A review of PRSs across Africa shows considerable ambivalence about migration; it is often either not recognised as a relevant issue (as is the case for seven sub-Saharan African PRSs), or not addressed (as is the case for ten other countries). In Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone, only forced migration is considered. Overwhelmingly, where economic migration is mentioned, it is seen as negative. For example, migration is seen as: contributing to population growth (Gambia); placing pressure on urban areas (Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania); breaking down traditional family structures (Kenya, Malawi); promoting the spread of crime (Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, Sierra Leone); spreading diseases such as HIV/AIDS (Burkina Faso, Niger, Sierra Leone); stimulating land degradation (Ethiopia); and reinforcing rural poverty (Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Malawi, Niger, Sierra Leone). Only Cape Verde and Senegal mention emigration as a positive factor. The Niger and Rwanda PRSs note that internal migration can boost household incomes of the poor. Where policy responses to migration are mentioned, these are primarily geared to reducing or preventing migration, mainly through promoting rural development. Exceptions to this include both Cape Verde and Senegal, which propose a strategy to promote remittances and engage emigrants in national development; and Mauritania's PRS, which suggests creating viable jobs in urban areas, rather than trying to prevent rural–urban migration.

Source: Black (2004)

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hostile to migrants, resulting in exclusion and discrimination. A positive change in attitude and policy to migrants will have significant benefits for the poor in many societies. There is a growing number of movements which are challenging this hostility, especially in Asia and Latin America.

Creating a favourable environment for migration should be a key aim for policies aiming to eradicate poverty. However, Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) do not offer a clear message about migration (Box 47). Important policy levers to facilitate migration include legislation on the free movement of labour (also including across national boundaries – see Box 48), support for organisations that offer protection against abuse and discrimination, and reforms to public service provision so that migrants are included. Bolder public policies, for example to provide affordable mass housing and urban services to migrant groups, can send a clear signal to both existing populations, and potential movers. As with discrimination, public information campaigns to change the representation of migrants in the media is a further important element. Civil society organisations and forms of collective action can play an important role, as illustrated by attempts to unionise *adivasi* (tribal) seasonal migrant labour, a group suffering severe forms of discrimination in many Indian cities.[33]

Enabling migrants to play a full sociopolitical, as well as economic, role in urban arenas can have important benefits for progressive societal change.[34] And as with urbanisation, migration can promote inclusion, greater gender equality and increased choice and agency.

Policies for a pro-poor demographic transition

Large family sizes and high dependency ratios are correlated with chronic poverty in some countries. Changes in these household characteristics are important factors in poverty exits and entries.[35] Evidence from South Asia shows that a large family size (and a high dependency ratio) is strongly correlated with entering and staying in poverty. Life cycle changes (generally increased dependency rates) are as important as health shocks and natural hazards (such as flooding) for poverty entries.[36] However, the evidence from sub-Saharan Africa is less convincing. Although certain studies suggest that greater dependency ratios may be a cause of poverty entries and persistent poverty,[37] other studies are less confident about the relationship.[38] Moreover, in areas of relative land abundance (such as Northern Ghana) there appears to be a virtuous circle between wealth and household labour supply, and a vicious circle between poverty and small household size.[39]

The direction of causality between high dependency ratios and poverty is not always clear, because one rational response to the risk and uncertainty that the poor face is to self-insure

> *Migration shakes up relationships and social orders.*

Box 48: Regional initiatives to facilitate migration

Many regional bodies have promoted agreements and measures to ease the constraints on cross-border migration. For example, the East African Community recently introduced East African passports, costing US$10 and valid for six months multiple entry and the West African ECOWAS Treaty obliges member states to remove obstacles to the free movement of people, goods and services and to guarantee immigrants' rights. The 1979 protocol has many provisions, of which only one has been implemented – visa-free travel for up to 90 days. There are many other positive actions which have been taken – the Senegalese labour code, for example, makes no distinction between nationals and immigrants. However, a common finding with regional initiatives is that they are bold on words, and short on implementation.

Source: Ba (2006)

Women attend a meeting organised by an NGO for influential members of the local community in which reproductive health issues are discussed; with the aim of their disseminating this information within their community (Nepalganj, Nepal). Photo © Peter Barker/Panos Pictures (2007).

through a large family. However, as there is an association between chronic poverty and large household size (especially in South Asia), this means that it is increasingly hard for policymakers to ignore the issue.

In a similar fashion to gender equality (to which it is closely linked), demographic transition can take different forms and speeds. The poor often come to the demographic transition late, but development policy can speed up their participation (see Box 49). Social protection removes the need to self-insure through having children. Compulsory education can reduce or remove the incentives for child labour. Basic health and sanitation measures reduce child mortality, thus limiting the need for larger families. But a reduced fertility rate does not necessarily lead to lower dependency ratios, as the cohort of older adults places an increasing strain on families for support, and creates obligations on the state which it may not be prepared for. (China is in this situation – desperately in need of social protection measures to compensate for its dramatically reduced fertility rate.)

Enhanced gender equality is central to demographic transition. Significant cultural variation requires a careful, context-specific approach to achieve this, and of the roles of reproductive health services as a tool for achieving both gender equality and demographic transition. At the national level, a key issue is the lack of demand by the poor for reproductive health services, as with other social services. Such demand is

constrained in several ways: for example, by male domination of intra-household decisions on children; culturally sanctioned constraints on women's physical mobility; and information asymmetries. Demand for such services can be stimulated by non-medical reproductive health agents (the Bangladesh model, which has succeeded in bringing fertility down to below that which would normally be expected at Bangaldesh's level of income), and women's education, preferably supported by women's employment in qualification-demanding sectors (the 'West Indies' model).[40]

The international development policy community has abrogated its responsibilities for both gender equality and reproductive health services. The 2000/1 MDGs specifically excluded both as goals – only including a gender equality target under education; and the reduced maternal mortality goal (with the removal of reproductive health services achieved by a coalition of the American Christian 'right', and conservative Muslim nations). As of 2007, following significant lobbying from women's movements, a target specifying universal access to reproductive health services has been agreed, with indicators to follow. Gender equality has proved too controversial to address head on. As far as eradicating chronic poverty is concerned, these are two key elements that are missing from the international agenda.

These omissions may have held back progress on critical social change processes, illustrating that while the MDGs should be supported, they are not comprehensive. Countries should be free to develop their own priorities, speeds and pathways. The country-led policy processes in place (PRSs, budget support) are supposed to achieve this, and the UN's MDG 'project' needs to find a way of recognising this.

Post-primary education

Educational opportunities can play a significant role in breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Education can change social relationships, especially towards gender equality (as recognised by the education MDG target which, however, was not achieved).[41] It can build inclusive citizenship and democratic participation, as well as the social networks that are vital for poverty exits. Education can increase self-esteem and confidence – the well-educated are better able to negotiate for higher wages, manage rural–urban transitions, and extract themselves from exploitative relationships.

Educational levels (as proxied by adult illiteracy) are lowest in Africa and South Asia, with only limited recent improvements (adult illiteracy has even worsened in West Africa lately). In contrast, there have been recent significant improvements in adult literacy in the Middle East and in East Asia and the Pacific, particularly for women (see Annex F). Regional indicators of gender inequality also show that gender ratios (F/M) for adult literacy and gross primary school enrolment are still significantly below parity in Africa (including North Africa) and South Asia. East Asia and the

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Box 49: Access to reproductive health services in rural Uganda

As of 2002, Gladys and Moses – who live in Kalangaalo village, Mubende, Uganda – had 11 children, only two of whom had married and left home. Their eldest daughter lives close by, but Moses is still waiting for the bride price from his son-in-law. His eldest son works as a labourer at a fishing site (but Moses still sends money occasionally). The remaining nine children live at home. Whilst having a large family supports the subsistence-orientated farming strategy of the household (through the provision of household labour), and might provide support and security in old age, Moses and Gladys struggle to pay the requisite school fees and for uniforms which they both want to provide for their children.

Gladys has been very uncertain about using injections and pills for contraception, which have been available from the health clinic and a nearby NGO. Instead, she has relied on traditional forms of contraception, which have not worked. Moses and Gladys' lack of education has limited their awareness of, and engagement with, local family planning services. These services might, if Moses and Gladys had chosen to go down this path, have allowed the couple to focus their resources on a smaller family.

Source: Bird, K., fieldwork notes.

Pacific and Latin America and Caribbean show gender ratios much closer to parity, although there has been no significant movement in these indicators in recent years (see Annex F3).

What is the human story behind these statistics? Let us return to the stories of Angel, Bakyt and Maymana's son Mofizul. Like most poor children with a disability in Bangladesh, Mofizul never went to school. Now as an uneducated adult, he has no choice but to engage in physical labour to provide for his family, although this work is difficult, painful and tiring for him, and provides a low, often seasonal, wage. He has to rely on the goodwill of his employers to pay him a full adult wage. Basic literacy and numeracy may have allowed him to access other jobs, and to manage his own money without relying on employers and shopkeepers' help.

Angel had her first child when she was 12, but continued going to school until Form 2 (the second class in her Zimbabwean secondary school). She then had to drop out because her family ran out of money. She left her baby with her mother's family (when the baby was 21 months old) and as a 14-year-old moved to a town in the Midlands near Plot Shumba to look for work. Luckily, she found some, and worked as a 'house girl' for a middle-class family. But after a year she had to leave: her 'madam' was not paying her and she felt exploited.

Bakyt – the 11-year-old miner – helps his sister with the housework, and collects bricks from building demolition sites. Bakyt also occasionally goes to school. Considering the pressure Bakyt is under, he does remarkably well at school. But the chances of Bakyt receiving a complete education are very slim: not only because he works most of the time, but because his family cannot afford the required clothes and books. He rarely attends school in winter, as he does not have enough warm clothes. As Bakyt recognises himself, education may be the only chance for him or his siblings to escape from poverty.

What can be done for the Mofizuls, Angels and Bakyts of this world? Clearly, getting them a good quality primary education is imperative – and they need to be well nourished

The well-educated are better able to negotiate for higher wages, manage rural–urban transitions, and extract themselves from exploitative relationships.

and well clothed to benefit. Schooling, not work, should be the focus of their childhood years.

The recent policy emphasis has been on universal primary education, and improving the quality of this provision. But mobility out of poverty is linked with completing more than just primary school. The quality of both primary and post-primary education is critical for employment, self-employment and improved human development outcomes. Post-primary education may well have offered Angel opportunities, and prevented her from being forced into exploitative employment. Sixteen years on from the Jomtien commitments to universal primary education, the world needs to focus swiftly on a similar commitment to quality, accessible post-primary education, which also will improve primary level completion rates.

The MDG gender equality target for secondary education is far from being achieved. This is important, for in many situations girls' participation in secondary school reduces fertility rates. This is evidenced by the CPRC analysis of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data, which shows a very strong correlation between education and dependency ratios amongst the poorest quintile (see Box 50). Good quality schooling also could have raised Angel's awareness about HIV/AIDS.

The examples of Tamil Nadu in India (Box 51) and Bangladesh's Female Secondary School Assistance Programme illustrate that a public education system can ensure that female enrolment and attendance in secondary education equals or exceeds that of boys.[42] Straightforward measures include improving school infrastructure, increasing the numbers of female teachers in secondary schools, and making appropriate reforms to the curricula. Wider measures include providing scholarships to girls in rural areas, and educating communities on the importance of girls' education.

Considerable success is being achieved in applying conditional cash transfers to primary education. The experience of Bangladesh's Female Secondary School Assistance Prog-

ramme suggests that applying it to secondary education would have significant benefits too. It therefore seems appropriate that the instruments for promoting retention in primary school – such as conditional cash transfers, school feeding programmes, prevention and control of abusive teacher–pupil relationships and bullying, and the provision of alternative education for hard-to-reach children – can all be applied to the post-primary level (in addition to a strong focus on skills for employment, self-employment and healthy living). A special effort will be needed to reform post-primary education systems in Africa, where enrolment is extremely low.[43]

This is a complex agenda, but there are three practical steps that can be made:

- first, move slowly towards universal post-primary provision, bearing in mind that the middle classes are often self-provisioning through private education;

- second, recognise that scholarships or conditional cash transfers for poor children, especially girls but also children with disabilities and those from marginalised groups, are both feasible and desirable; and

- third, ensure that such measures can easily be targeted geographically, so that the poorest benefit most.

Such a commitment entails a significant increase in public expenditure, particularly on post-primary education. But the payoffs from investing in human capital are enormous. Take,

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Box 50: Adult illiteracy and dependency ratios amongst the poorest

DHS data provide some strong and convincing evidence of the close correlation between adult illiteracy and high dependency ratios. Overall, the DHS data show that adult illiteracy amongst the poorest quintile was greatest in Ethiopia, Nigeria and Bangladesh (consistent with these countries' status as Chronically and Partially Chronically Deprived Countries). The pentagrams below also show that in all countries, apart from Nigeria, adult illiteracy of the poorest quintile was highest among households that had a high dependency ratio (shown by the skewing of the pentagram to the south and west). The Nigerian data add some weight to the argument that the links between poverty and household size/dependency need to recognise regional variations.

The five countries show startlingly different trends in terms of adult illiteracy. Indonesia (1997-2002) and Ethiopia (2000-05) have both improved the adult illiteracy of the poorest quintile in households of all sizes. On the other hand, in Bangladesh (1999-2004) and Kenya (1998-2003) adult illiteracy of the poorest quintile has worsened, especially for households with a large dependency ratio.

Source: CPRC DHS analysis: see Annex H

for example, the average public expenditure on education as a percentage of total government expenditure for our four country categories. Here we can see that Chronically Deprived Countries spend less than 4%, Partially Chronically Deprived Countries spend just over 5%, Partial Consistent Improvers spend under 7%, and Consistent Improvers spend over 8%.[44]

Of our six policy areas, the returns to investment in education appear greatest, with clear contributions towards gender equality, social inclusion and achieving greater levels of 'agency' and economic choice. For Angel, Mofizul and Bakyt, post-primary education, free at the point of use, and with support for their families, would change their lives for the better. Quality civic education for all children – rich and poor – can also help build the social compact more broadly.

C. Politics

Transformative social change is inherently political. Existing interests and power relations must be renegotiated. This should not inspire pessimism – such re-negotiations can and do occur, and are what constitutes significant political change. As important as they are, social movements cannot be expected to be the key or only force behind these changes. The role played by the state and political society is critical here.

The vision and commitment required to promote and manage transformative societal change is often associated with certain forms of developmental state. In such states, national elites are able to see beyond the short- to medium-term perspective of maintaining political power, and through the often inefficient and corrosive politics of patronage. However, there is no guarantee that the types of developmental state capable of achieving high rates of economic growth and structural change are equally adept at, or committed to, protecting marginalised people (witness the plight of the San in Botswana, a prime example of a developmental state in Africa). Political elites and parties can and need to be engaged by development actors – to try and promote a stronger focus on the most marginal groups, and to understand the incentives these actors respond to, and the broader coalitions for change that can be built.

It seems that programmatic political parties, particularly those with strong social movement characteristics, are most likely to represent the interests of the poorest groups of society. They can also be associated with challenging disempowering forms of patronage. Such parties tend to operate most successfully in party systems that are well institutionalised and non-fragmentary. The development of such systems can be enabled by introducing rules that prevent the emergence of either too many parties, or parties being formed around a narrow range of interests, such as region or ethnicity. One example is Ghana, where a strong two-party system is emerging.

The wider process by which developmental states emerge relates to state formation. The forging of political institutions has often been associated with the transformation of societies from rural to urban societies, or from colonialism to independence. Political settlements are thus reached between elite groups and different groups within society. These in turn broadly shape the socioeconomic status and entitlements accorded to each group. There is no guarantee that this process will benefit the worst-off, or even the majority of citizens (and in some cases the impoverishing effects of state formation can be fixed for generations, as in the cases of Northern Uganda

Box 51: Midday Meals programme, Tamil Nadu, India

The cost of sending children to school (whether enrolment fees, textbooks or lost income from child labour) is not the only barrier to poor children's access to education. Undernourishment is one important factor. Many poor children are undernourished, and 'may suffer from poor cognitive development … have difficulty in concentrating, may be irritable, are more prone to infection and thus to miss school – all of which lower their likelihood of attaining well'.[45]

In the light of this, school meals programmes act both to reduce poor children's exclusion from schooling, and improve their terms of inclusion, through boosting their nutrition. From the mid-1990s, India has promoted the national roll-out of free midday meals in public primary schools for all pupils (extending this to include alternative education centres from 2002). By 2005-06 it covered just under 953,000 schools/education centres, with just over 119 million pupils.[46] Implementation has varied across states, with differences in cost, quality and impact. Tamil Nadu, where the scheme began in the 1980s, is cited as being particularly effective: varied and nutritious meals are prepared by cooks (rather than teachers), at the price of just over one rupee per child per day. In large parts of the country this programme appears to have had significant positive effects on pupil attendance and retention, especially for girls. The states of Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan, for example, saw increases in girls' enrolment by close to 20% in the year the meals were introduced.[47]

The supply side of education provision is also crucial – with the proximity of schools to the poor, the quality of teaching and materials, and social relations within schools all important. The programme's chief contribution here is in encouraging children from different castes to eat together, which seems to be a widespread practice, despite some reported objections from upper caste parents.[48] This is a small, but potentially useful, step towards weakening the caste discrimination prevalent in many schools that limits dalit (formerly known as untouchable) and adivasi (tribal) childrens' opportunities and helps to reinforce social norms of inequality and hierarchy among all children.[49] Such a change in the social relations within schools is important if the education system is to create exit routes from poverty, rather than maintaining children in poverty across generations.

Sources: See Endnotes

and Ghana). Historically, the institution created to resolve this process of forging a settlement between elite and mass groups, and which holds the promise of more universal gains within society, has been that of the social compact (see Chapter 6).

The Anderanboucane Village Women's Association operates literacy and credit schemes. Sikiwate Boubacar explains: "Being literate has opened our minds and given us new ideas. That's why I'm now convinced that being able to go to school is the key to our problems. I want to send my own children to school." (Menaka, Mali). Photo © Crispin Hughes/Panos Pictures (2003).

Box 52: Alternative Basic Education for Karamoja (ABEK): Uganda

'Non-formal', or 'alternative', education schemes have been used around the world, to make education accessible to groups who have experienced *de facto* exclusion from the formal schooling system. Alternative Basic Education for Karamoja (ABEK) is a joint project of the Ugandan government, UNICEF and Save the Children Norway (SCNU). It was piloted by SCNU and is now incorporated into the national drive for universal primary education. Karamoja is a remote rural region in North East Uganda, mainly inhabited by nomadic pastoralist groups, collectively referred to as the Karamojong. For decades the Karamojong were seen as a 'problem' by central government. Under the Amin regime they were subject to 'pacification', in the form of military repression. Allegations of abuses by the Ugandan military continue today.[50] Literacy and health indicators in the region are among Uganda's worst.[51]

ABEK aims to improve educational outcomes in the region, by making formal education more accessible to Karamojong children, and by responding to fears among Karamojong adults that the education system would alienate children from their culture. It involves training Karamojong teachers, who travel with their class, conducting classes in local languages. It develops a timetable and curriculum, in close consultation with Karamojong people and which is adapted to fit with the children's responsibilities (often as cattle herders). Winning state support for the programme has been an achievement in itself. Further, it has endured and been expanded from its initial coverage. There has been a dramatic rise in the number of Karamojong children (and adults) enrolled, from approximately 7,000 in the year 2000 to approximately 32,000 by 2005.[52] Basic literacy and numeracy rates have improved, to approximately 50% among those enrolled (as against 11% of the population in the region in general).[53] On the other hand, only a small number make the transition to mainstream primary and formal education, and most of those drop out.[54] Attendance is generally low (roughly 33% at any one time[55]) and although the majority of pupils enrolled are female, they constitute a tiny minority of those that go on to mainstream education.[56]

Rather than any failure on behalf of ABEK, the low transition rate may simply indicate that the programme's educational model is better suited to its context than the mainstream system. This perhaps suggests a need for a continuation of similar flexibility into higher primary and secondary education, rather than attempting to use the programme to draw children into an unsatisfactory 'mainstream'.[57]

Sources: See Endnotes

D. Policy contexts

Our six policy spheres – post-primary education, reproductive health services, anti-discrimination and gender equality, strategic urbanisation and migration, and providing an enabling environment for social movements – will not be equally applicable across country contexts. Particular elements are more feasible in different political environments. For example, in CDCs, where good governance is often at a premium, societal cohesion is limited. Urbanisation, migration and education policies are likely to offer greater legitimacy amongst elites, as they also contribute strongly to economic growth.

Social movements are likely to face more obstacles in CDCs, especially where experience of democracy is limited. Social movements are rarely spontaneous grassroots uprisings, but heavily dependent on financial, human, informational, social and other resources.[58] The channelling of such resources to movements generally requires the involvement of 'social movement organisations', e.g. NGOs, churches, student bodies, formal peasant or ethnic associations, and university groups.[59] Benefactors may require that social movements modify their demands or membership. Those social movements lacking resources may thus have limited autonomy.[60] Most of the more vibrant civic groups throughout Africa cannot sustain themselves for more than a few months from the annual subscriptions paid by their registered members.[61]

Social movements in resource-rich countries typically pursue an even more challenging agenda: protests at loss of land and forced land sales; at the loss of royalties and tax revenues through exemptions; at the privatisation of assets; and against the loss of a way of life. From the point of view of the chronically poor, the most significant aspects of this agenda are the protests against loss of assets, and the demands for greater distribution of the benefits through the tax system.

Successfully negotiated agreements can build positive social compacts.

A key impediment to social movements is their often limited knowledge of the workings of government and state apparatus – how government departments work, how policies are made and the implications of policies. In Africa, such limited knowledge is partly because this information is rarely made public.[62] General awareness of issues is also limited by censorship of the media, and by poor dissemination of information, particularly to rural areas.[63] Where a positive political and economic transition has started, and the challenge is to sustain it, notions of justice, underpinning anti-discrimination legislation and social movements, can begin to play an important role.

Table 7 summarises the kinds of policy measures capable of promoting positive changes in social relationships, which will result in progress towards gender equality, social inclusion and greater economic agency. As in Chapter 3, this matrix is not founded on a rigorous research base, but is a simple tool to encourage an improved fit between policy suggestions and country context.

E. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on policies and public actions which can foster beneficial social changes – characterised as expanded social inclusion, enhanced gender empowerment, and increased agency and economic choice. Six sets of policies have been identified. We argue that these policies and public actions can play a considerable role in tackling three key traps: social discrimination, limited citizenship and poor work opportunities.

Table 7: National policies for transformative societal change

Policies	Chronically Deprived Countries (CDCs)	Recently improving CDCs	Partially Chronically Deprived Countries	Consistent Improvers
Anti-discrimination	Specific legislation to promote inclusion of minorities, to ensure political stability	Legislation on gender equality; legislation or other measures (e.g. minimum wages) to control discrimination in labour markets	Comprehensive constitutional agreements? Legislation on child labour to tighten labour markets	Broader regulation of labour markets
Urbanisation	Develop national urbanisation policy and infrastructure investments – getting the most out of urbanisation for the poor as a whole	City policies on pro-poor (labour-intensive) growth and gender equality	Quality mass urban services to break adverse incorporation	Quality mass urban services to break adverse incorporation
Migration	Migrant support programmes; public information to counter negative stereotypes	Migrant support programmes; public information to counter negative stereotypes; remove restrictions on mobility	Open up trans-national movement; remove restrictions on labour mobility	Implement migrant rights and entitlements
Demographic transition	Foster demand and improve supply of reproductive health services (RHS)	Foster demand and improve supply of RHS	Sustain demand through girls' education, universal access to RHS	Sustain demand through girls' education, universal access to RHS
Post-primary education (PPE)	Universal PPE (including technical/vocational)	Universal, compulsory PPE; widespread scholarships for poor children (girls) in secondary and tertiary education	Free and compulsory PPE	Support for tertiary education, including extensive scholarships for the poor
Social movements	Public authority strengthened and civil and political rights protected, as a means of encouraging citizen engagement and reducing transaction costs for citizenship participation	Social movements focus on asset redistribution and social protection	Direct support to actors within social movements that maintain a focus on the poorest	Coalition-building between social movements and political institutions

Anti-discriminatory action – both sensitisation campaigns and affirmative action – can facilitate exits from poverty, if combined with broader egalitarian social and economic policies. Social movements have a strong role to play in rebalancing the inequitable distribution of political, social and economic power and enhancing the collective power of the poor. We argue that the quality of the policy environment is critical to their fortunes.

Migration's role as a liberator or oppressor is under-researched, but, with increased protection and access to social services, it can be another route out of poverty. This can be supported by allowing the free regional movement of labour, by progressively implementing migrants' entitlements to social services, and by disseminating public information to counter negative stereotypes.

> *Social movements have a strong role to play in rebalancing the inequitable distribution of power.*

Though largely neglected in the design and implementation of the MDGs until recently, gender equality must be supported, through the improvement of access to reproductive health services and a more concerted effort towards gender equality in education. Post-primary education is also instrumental in improving agency, voice and inclusive citizenship (as well as economic opportunity). Given its importance, we recommend that post-primary education become compulsory as rapidly as possible. We recommend that governments or other agencies sequentially provide targeted scholarships, and then, when it becomes possible, abolish user fees. Collectively these six policy measures will contribute to fostering the social compact between citizens and the state.

Notes

1.   Ali *et al.* (1998)

2.   Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998)

3.   Ali *et al.* (1998): 46

4.   Bebbington and Mitlin (2006)

5.   Lavalle *et al.* (2005)

6.   Moore and Putzel (1999); Houtzager with Pattenden (2003)

7.   Chilton (2004)

8.   Andonlina (2003)

9.   Kay (2004)

10.   Yashar (1999)

11.   Mosse *et al.* (2005)

12.   As reported in Kabeer (2005): 14-15.

13.   Bebbington (2006); Bebbington and Mitlin (2006)

14.   Greenslade and Johnstone (2004)

15.   Skoufias and McClafferty (2001)

16.   Bennett (2003)

17.   Rubalcava *et al.* (2002)

18.   Hoff and Pandey (2004)

19.   Janet (2003): 23-25

20.   Hall and Patrinos (2005)

21.   Iturralde (2001): 14

22.   However, these figures have been disputed by Jomo (2004).

23.   De Haas (2007)

24.   Yusof (2005): 3

25.   Henderson *et al.* (2002): 2

26.   Henderson *et al.* (2002): 8

27.   Yusof (2005); Stewart (2001): 19

28.   Stewart (2001): 19

29.   Deshingkar and Start (2003); Farrington *et al* (2006)

30.   Hugo (2005)

31.   Hugo (2005)

32. Jayaweera *et al.* (2002)

33. Mosse *et al.* (2005)

34. Mamdani (1996)

35. Prowse and Rizvi (forthcoming)

36. Sen (1985a)

37. For example, see Bigsten *et al.* (2003) on Ethiopia, and Christiaensen and Boisvert (2000) on Mali.

38. Muyanga *et al.* (2007) find that both smaller and larger households experience more chronic poverty.

39. See Whitehead (2006)

40. Handwerker (1989)

41. This event passed virtually without comment, indicating how little the development policy community is actively monitoring, and genuinely focused on, gender equality. While this was probably a failure of education, rather than gender equality policies as such, many education systems have clearly failed to get to grips with the factors which influence the gendered dimensions of schooling, especially the retention of girls.

42. UN Millennium Project (2005) Task Force on Education and Gender Equality

43. The World Bank, among others, have started this endeavour; see http://go.worldbank.org/ME9KURHB40

44. Anderson (2007)

45. Rose and Dyer (2006): 30

46. Government of India (2006b) Department of Education and Literacy

47. Rose and Dyer (2006): 32

48. Drèze and Goyal (2003): 4675-4677

49. Hoff and Pandey (2004)

50. Amnesty International (2003)

51. Okech (2005): 8; Nagel (2002): 4

52. Bakaengura (2003); Okech (2005)

53. UNOHCHR (2003)

54. Save the Children Norway (2003); Baker (2001)

55. Carr-Hill *et al.* (2005)

56. Save the Children Norway (2003)

57. Okech (2005); Krätli (2001)

58. Ballard *et al.* (2005)

59. Bebbington (2006)

60. Diamond (1997); Makumbe (1998)

61. Makumbe (1998)

62. A report from the African Civil Society Forum details the unreliability and sporadic nature of financial contributions to NGOs, which inhibit their constructing a strong financial base and long-term perspective (Makumbe 1998).

63. The aforementioned report of the African Civil Society Forum adds that African Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) would benefit from a periodic forum, to share experiences and respond to emerging questions (see Makumbe 1998).